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Head and Hand: Rhetorical Resources in British 
Pedagogical Writing, 1770-1850 
STEVEN SHAPIN and BARRY BARNES 
All pedagogical writings and theoretical treatments of the process of education tend to be 
developed on the basis of particular conceptions of the constitution of the mind, the nature 
of thought, and the relationship of knowledge and thinking.  Such conceptions may take 
the form of explicit psychological theories, or they may be informal, taken-for-granted 
models and presuppositions  to which appeal is routinely  made as  arguments proceed. 
In what follows we shall examine these conceptions as they are manifested in a selection 
of educational writings of the period I770 to 1850 in Britain, and we shall show how they 
were employed both to devise and to justify educational pr0gramrnes.l 
The writings of this period and place make a particularly interesting case study, since 
they derive from a context characterized by rapid innovation in education, when intense 
concern with pedagogical problems was felt by a wide range of upper and middle-class 
groupings. The rapid changes in the distribution of wealth, power and social standing 
induced by the processes of industrialization had stimulated a re-appraisal of the functions 
and effectiveness of existing educational provisions and a search for new forms and in- 
stitutions. Writers frequently laid bare their assumptions and cognitive models, as well as 
their goals and interests, in an unusually clear and distinct fashion. 
While we  use historical materials,  our intention is not simply to offer a study of  a 
particularly accessible historical context. Rather, it is to use the context, and the material 
selected from it, as a forum wherein to raise some issues evidently of general significance 
in the understanding of pedagogical writings. The  general predicament of pedagogy is that 
it is bound to proceed on the basis of assumptions which are difficult to develop and correct 
via empirical feedback, and which are peculiarly liable to be influenced by social interests 
and conceptions  of the social order.  By  observing  this  in our chosen  context  we  put 
ourselves in a better position to consider how we might take account of this continuing 
problem. 
MENTAL TYPES 
Although  the educational writings with which we are engaged differed widely in their 
interests,  their analyses of the role of education,  and the programmes  they advocated, 
they were in remarkable  agreement  upon  the general features of  the mentality  of the 
subjects  of  those  programmes.  To be  more  precise,  the  agreement  concerned  their 
mentalities, since, according to whether the 'higher orders' or the 'lower ranks' were being 
considered, adults were credited with one or other of two well-defined types of mental it^.^ 
As  would  be  expected,  our  writers,  being  representatives  of  the dominant  sectors  of 
society, accounted themselves mentally superior to the lower orders by reference to their 232  Oxford Review of  Education 
own superior mentality  and the contrasting  mentality  of those below them,  which ac- 
counted for their 'stupidity'.  There is nothing especially significant in this alone, but the 
precise categories used  to characterize the contrasting  mentalities  are of  considerable 
interest. 
We can identify three central dichotomies employed to effect this contrast. The  fist  sets 
the sensual and concrete character of the thought of the lower orders against the intellectual, 
verbal and abstract qualities of the thinking of those above them. Not surprisingly  3  g  i  ven 
that our writers all to some extent gained standing from their verbal skills, this charac- 
terization amounted to an assertion of the worthlessness of the mentality of the masses. 
Just  as  their  behaviour  was  condemned  as  sensual  and  debauched  by  middle-class 
moralists, so too was  their thought condemned, often in the same breath.  In a typical 
formulation, the surgeon-reformer  Gaskell, treating of the immorality of factory hands, 
explained that their "mind does not keep equal pace with the body . . . Its better qualities 
are destroyed by the preponderance of animal sensations",  thus providing a constitutional 
basis for the alleged sexual depravity of the industrial work force. In coping with that 
force,  "it  must be remembered that the mind  of the mill artisan  is  little  disposed to 
intellectual  pursuit^".^ 
Concrete sensual thought was  too superficial to lead one to truth and, therefore,  it 
could  hardly furnish a sound basis for conduct. The pseudonymous  'Country  Gentle- 
man',  a conservative polemicist  against  popular  education  in the  1820s~  put it most 
succintly: "Truth is said to lie at the bottom of a well, not on the surface: in other words, 
whatever appears only superficially right, is probably ~rong."~  To  attain truth one needed 
the ability intellectually to go behind appearances, to penetrate by  use of the abstract 
intellectual faculties to the realities which lay behind the mere sensual appearances on the 
cave wall.  On the other hand, cognition governed by the senses and not by the intellect 
could only be 'superficial' and, therefore, an inadequate surety for ethical behaviour. How 
could proper conduct be expected from 
"Beings who have hardly ever once . . . made a real effort to direct and concen- 
trate  the  action  of  their  faculties  on  anything  abstracted  from  the  objects 
palpable to the senses[?] . . .  The abstracted, contemplative, and elevated ideas 
of the celestial happiness are far above their apprehen~ion."~ 
The connection between the psychological and the moral diagnoses which their betters 
made  of  the lower  orders'  condition  is  evident.  Because  their  minds  were  sensually 
governed,  their  thought  was  superficial;  lacking internal structure, their  thought  was 
amoral. Hence,  superficiality in thought and sensuality in behaviour are aspects of the 
same imputation. The contrast between the superficiality of the thought of the masses and 
theprofundity of that of their betters is demonstrably a sub-theme of the central dichotomy 
set out above. And whereas superficial thought produced animal-like conduct, profound 
thought led to correct moral deportment. 
This cognitive and moral inferiority of the lower orders 'Country Gentleman' regarded 
as  the appropriate correlate  of  their  menial position  in the system  of  the division of 
labour : 
"It  may easily be  shown that practice  and theory  seldom unite in the same 
individual; that the occupation  of  the practitioner  requires  all his  time and 
thoughts to fulfil the wishes of eye or hand: whilst the theorist reasons within 
himself, and  throws himself on his mind. Theoretical excellence must have reason 
for its soil, which mechanics have not."" Head  and Hand  233 
Nor,  it should be  added,  did  'Country  Gentleman'  think it proper  that practice and 
theory  should  be  united  in  particular  individuals,  or  that  mechanics  should  possess 
theoretical excellence. 
The second central dichotomy to be noted is that between the simplicity of the thought 
of the lower orders and the complexity of that of their betters. Again, the contrast had, for 
our  writers,  an  immediate  and obvious evaluative connotation.  Those whose thought 
lacks richness of detail, variety or the capacity to apprehend and appreciate the relations 
between varied phenomena are indeed still said to be 'simple-minded',  with the identical 
evaluative  implication.  The masses  evidently  could  not  perceive  those  relationships 
between  phenomena  which the higher  orders took into account to direct their actions 
coherently for the long-term  good. Their heads were crowded with  "trifling  and cur- 
rupting ideas";  "they think nothing at all about their existence and life in any moral or 
abstracted or generalizing reference whatever".'  Their thought was immediate and lacking 
in potency, in contrast to the connected chains of inference characteristic of the thought 
of their superiors. 
If it suited the writer's purpose the simplistic and sensual thought of the lower orders 
could, without abandoning its characterization as inferior, be celebrated as appropriate. 
The simple,  immediate  and concrete  thought of  the peasant  is  well-known from the 
romantic idyll tradition, and similar celebrations of the wit and sense of a 'contented' 
proletariat  appear  in the conservative literature of  the early nineteenth  cent~ry.~  The 
native wit and natural 'wisdom'  of the lower orders might be shown to be well-adapted 
to their lot, yet still qualitatively different from and inferior to the thought of the higher 
ranks. 
From an imputation of simplicity it was easy for our writers to represent the thought of 
the lower orders as  actually or potentially unbalanced. The connection could be  made 
plausible by invoking the informal faculty psychology which was widely accepted in the 
nineteenth century, whether in reified form as phrenology, or in some longer-standing, 
more abstract variant.  The human mind was  constituted out of  a variety of cognitive 
faculties; either these would receive proper exercise, or, failing this, they would fall into 
disuse, upsetting normal balance between their working. In  the characteristically simplistic 
thinking of the lower orders many faculties would indeed appear under- or unemployed. 
Their mentality  would  therefore lack  the balance between  faculties,  and  consequent 
stability, of that of their betters. Thus, left to themselves, the manufacturing classes were, 
according to the infamous Andrew Ure, 
".  . .the slaves of prejudice and vice; they can see objects only on  one side, that 
which a sinister selfishness presents  to their view; they are readily moved to 
outrage by crafty demagogues . . ."" 
Because his mental processes were (or had been made) unbalanced,  the worker could 
easily be, as Henry Brougham and many others warned, "tossed to and fro by the sleight 
of men";  his  moral,  economic and political behaviour  was  therefore volatile. He was 
prone to superstition and credulity.  Lack of balance was  particularly  stressed by those 
writers who saw a need to intervene and modify the thought of the lower orders by the 
imposition of some form of educational regimen. 
As with the sensual character of thought, so was its simplistic nature amongst the lower 
orders linked to the division of labour and associated with the existence of differentiation 
and the routinization  of  tasks. Conservative writers  were generally content to note an 
association of  mentality  with  position  in the hierarchy  of  skills.  But  for  'bourgeois' 
writers that hierarchy  took on explanatory significance in environmentalist  accounts of 
the creation of mental characteristics. Such accounts could legitimate radical or reformist 234  Oxford Review of  Education 
polemics, in which case an optimistic view of the possibility of reversing the influence of 
environment was typical. Or they could be presented as matter-of-fact diagnoses, without 
a great deal of concern for how the social and economic order might be changed. The 
epitome of such 'disinterested' analysis is Adam Smith's Wealth of  Nations, the educational 
remedies  of  which  profoundly  influenced  Henry  Brougham  fifty years  later.  "In  the 
progress of the division of labour",  Smith said, 
"the employment of the far greater part of those who live by labour, comes to be 
confined to a few very simple operations; frequently to one or  two.  But the 
understandings  of  the  greater  part  of  men  are  necessarily formed by their 
ordinary employments. The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few 
simple operations, of which the effects too are, perhaps, always the same, or very 
nearly the same, has no occasion to exert his understanding or to exercise his 
invention . . .  He naturally . . . becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible 
for a human creature to become".1° 
And with perfect consistency Smith accounted for the general intellectual skills of elites 
in the same environmentalist terms as  those  which  explained  working-class simplicity 
and moral 'torpor' : 
"The employments, too, in which people of some rank or fortune spend their 
lives, are not, like those of the common people, simple and uniform. They are 
almost all of them extremely complicated, and such as  exercise the head more 
than the hands. The understandings of those who are engaged in such employ- 
ments can seldom grow torpid for want of exercise."ll 
From the great reformer Kay-Shuttleworth we have an impassioned identification of the 
factory system as the effective cause of lower-class simplicity and immorality: 
"The dull routine of a ceaseless drudgery, in which the same mechanical process 
is incessantly repeated, resembles the torment of Sisyphus .. . The mind gathers 
neither stores nor strength from the constant extension and retraction of the 
same muscles. The intellect slumbers in supine inertness; but the grosser parts 
of our nature attain such a rank development. To  condemn man to such severity 
of toil is, in some measure, to cultivate in him the habits of an animal."12 
The 'unnatural'  and enforced disuse of some of the higher of the mental faculties was a 
stock  resource,  the  invocation  of  which  enabled  nineteenth-century  phrenologist-re- 
formers like George Combe and John Conolly to indict the general character of industrial 
society as the cause of working-class stupidity, immorality and insanity.13 
Finally, the third central dichotomy, already alluded to in some of the quotations above, 
concerns the active use of knowledge and experience by the higher orders, contrasted with 
the passive and automatic way in which the lower ranks were assumed to react to experi- 
ence. Things simply happen to the lower orders; material is impressed upon their minds. 
And this diagnosis is the same whether the 'influence' is an iniquitous social order to be 
reformed,  a uplifting course of education to be prescribed,  or a crafty demagogue to be 
guarded against. The sensually-based, superficial and simple thought of the lower orders 
did not allow them to produce mediated responses to experience, or to make deep con- 
nections  between  different  pieces  of  information,  such  as  would  permit  them  to  be 
generalized for use as resources in a wide range of contexts. This was the diagnosis which 
justified the characterization of their learning process as passive and mechanical; facts and 
ideas entered their minds by absorption. In contrast the higher orders could, as we have 
seen,  incorporate  perceptions,  knowledge  and  information  into  coherent  systems  of Head  and Hand  235 
thought and sequences of inferences. By  so doing, they could, on the one hand, extend 
their range of applicability, and, on the other, bring a range of abstract principles  and 
symbolic operations to bear upon them. Thus, they could, unlike the lower orders, make 
active use  of knowledge and experience;  whatever it was,  it served to extend the pos- 
sibilities of their thought. In society, as in the body, the head was reflective, manipulative 
and controlling; the hand, unreflective, mechanical, determined by instructions. Thus, 
even where the lower orders were found troublesome, their restiveness was not dignified 
by treatment as active opposition, a rational response based on their real interest; it was, 
as we have noted, deemed the result of "volatilityn-they  were "tossed  to and fro by the 
sleight of men". 
We are now in a position to tabulate the characteristic properties of the two distinct types 
of mentality which stand in polar opposition to each  other  and which  were  routinely 
used to distinguish the thought of the superior portion of society from that of the masses. 
For  ease  of  reference,  and  acknowledging  Platonic  and  Aristotelian  debts,  we  shall 
designate them the gnostic and banausic mentalities.14 
MENTALITY 
Gnostic  Banausic 
Thought  Intellectual  Sensual 
abstract  concrete 
profound  superficial 
verbal/symbolic  non-verballnon-symbolic 
Complex  Simple 
harmonious  unbalanced 
stable  volatile 
mediated  direct 
Responses  Active  Passive 
to  volitional  automated/mechanical 
Inputs  purposive  I  lacking in purpose 
Whatever  their  other differences, our writers  tended  to share these model forms  of 
mentality as resources for use in articulating, developing and justifying their educational 
views, although as we shall see the range of uses to which they were put was rather wider 
than we have so far implied. 
KNOWLEDGE AND CONTROL: THE THREE HIERARCHIES 
All our writers, indeed practically everyone of our period whose views on the subject are 
known, assumed a correspondence between the social heirarchy, on the one hand, and the 
distribution of mentalities and knowledge, on the other.15 Those possessing the gnostic 
mentality ruled those of banausic mentality-the  head ruled the hand. And those who 
ruled knew more, and knew more of significance, than those whom they ruled. As  one 
moved up into the higher ranks of society, one increasingly encountered more abstract, 
refined and complex modes of thought, and more extensive, finely-structured  and pro- 
found bodies of knowledge. Society was a triple hierarchy-of authority, of mentality, and 
of knowledge. 
It was  also agreed that such an association of hierarchies was  essential in any stable 
society. But  on the matter  of the relationship between  the three hierarchies  and the 
manner  in  which  they  determined  and  sustained  each  other  there  was  considerable 236  Oxford Review of  Education 
divergence of opinion. There were writers at this time, particularly among the ranks of 
conservatives and those who represented the landed interest, who assumed that the dis- 
tribution of knowledge was derivative of the hierarchy of authority,  or that it was con- 
strained into correspondence with a divinely-ordained, unalterable distribution of auth- 
ority and fixed mentality. It was given to the head to control and to the hand to respond, 
and the nature of both was fixed and immutable, in society as  in the body. Knowledge 
simply distributed itself as it was capable of being understood-the  complex and profound 
at the top, the simple and superficial at the base of society. The hierarchy of knowledge 
derived from the other fixed hierarchies.16 
But this position was little in evidence among writers actively concerned to justify the 
value of education and argue for the wider diffusion of knowledge. For the advocates of 
educational interventions knowledge was a commodity to be sold, and it had to be granted 
a potency  of some sort.  Similarly, those  opposed  to popular  education,  or  politically 
opposed in general terms to its advocates, typically spoke of the pernicious consequences 
of the diffusion of knowledge, in order to present the most persuasive case possible.17  Thus, 
in the debates over the wider diffusion of knowledge it was commonly assumed that the 
hierarchy of knowledge could, at least to some extent, affect the stability of the other two 
hierarchies.  Knowledge  'properly  distributed'  could  reinforce  and  sustain  the social 
order; knowledge 'improperly  graded' or 'out  of place'  could lead to social conflict and 
the erosion of due deference. It was essential to social stability (even, or especially, in the 
views of popular educationalists) that the lower orders be less knowledgeable, that they 
possess an 'appropriate',  and inferior, quality of knowledge. 
The precise grounds for  accepting this  principle,  and the detailed  accounts of how 
knowledge and its distribution affected the other two hierarchies, varied widely. According 
to their aims and interests, and the existing accepted presuppositions of their cultures and 
contexts, writers constructed appropriate theories of the connections between knowledge, 
mentality and behaviour. By reference to these theories they advocated their programmes 
and denounced those of their opponents. The two mentalities were exploited as cultural 
resources in a whole range of arguments, theoretical structures and models of social order. 
It was  important to stress that there was no limit on the way in which these resources 
could be used, and there was no necessary connection between the interests of a writer and 
the kinds of theory he constructed out of these resources. That such resources were em- 
ployed is  of more general significance than details of particular  instances showing how 
they were employed. 
It might be  assumed that banausic  and gnostic mentalities were permanently  fixed 
by nature or by God, whereupon the power of knowledge would be linked to the function 
of relating the mentalities. Properly distributed, it could operate as a symbolic display of 
social standing,  enabling the various orders better  to recognize the hierarchy  and the 
sectors to which deference was due. And it might also serve as a medium enabling com- 
munication between the top and the base of society, a vehicle through which the head 
could control the hand. Incorlectly distributed, knowledge could stimulate the masses to 
aspire upwards and give them the resources to use in doing so. Although, perhaps, their 
natural  inferiority  would  doom  these  aspirations  to  ultimate  failure,  the  temporary 
turbulence would be troublesone and inconvenient. Alternatively, it might be supposed 
that the mentalities were interconvertible, and, to some extent, the product of knowledge 
itself. From this it could be argued that unreliable, volatile banausoi might be rendered 
responsible,  stable  gnostics by  appropriate education,  or,  conversely, that  dangerous, 
hostile banausoi might be convened into even more dangerous hostile gnostics.18 The 
natural extension of this controversy was for one side to distinguish kinds of knowledge, 
and to impute to them different forms of efficacy: there was knowledge which imparted Head  and Hand  237 
the admirable active mentality of the elite; knowledge which reinforced and controlled the 
banausic mentality and determined its operation; knowledge which filled the minds of the 
banausoi and prevented the intrusion of dangerous propaganda--of  ideas originating in 
the heads of dangerous radicals, capable of determining the automated social hand and 
perverting its activity. Conversely, the opposition to this view would deny the existence 
of such different kinds of knowledge: whatever it was intended for, knowledge would be 
used by the banausoi as a general potentiating competence; they would twist it to their 
own ends, turn it upon its donors, use it as a resource. That which was intended to res- 
strict the mind would be found to develop or even demonically transform it. 
All these arguments, and many more, were thrown up in the context of political debate 
over the scope, nature and role of education; it would be the task of a much longer paper to 
attempt a full taxonomy. They are a tribute to man's  skill and endless creativity in the 
construction of rationalizations and adaptation of cultural resources to the exigencies of 
concrete situations. And it is as situated responses to particular  polemical requirements 
and not necessarily as the coherent philosophies of individuals that we must treat these 
materials. We cannot expect the different arguments of particulal  individuals always to 
add up to some consistent, systematically-organized whole. They rarely do; but they are 
not, by 'failing'  as philosophy, less worthy of serious attention. 
Let us now flesh out this provisional taxonomy with a number of concrete instances. 
Among many explicit discussions of knowledge as a means of relating the two mentalities 
and symbolically reinforcing their heirarchical relationship, one finds that of the Scottish 
professor and educationalist James Pillans. He clearly linked social order :o  the distribu- 
tion of knowledge along its hierarchy: 
"If  there  is  any  chance of the frame-work  of society being  strained or  dis-
jointed in consequence of the progress of popular instruction, it is not from the 
diffusion of knowledge that the danger is to be apprehended, but from the higher 
ranks being left behind in the race of improvement."19 
This linkage he explained  by  holding  the  possession of knowledge to be  a necessary 
symbolic requirement in asserting and displaying status. Acknowledgement of the higher 
orders'  superiority depe~ded  upon  their effective display of  "superior  acquirements". 
"Superior  knowledge"  and "ease  of manner",  "gracefulness of deportment"  and "varied 
accomplishments"  result in "a  charm  [being] thrown over the character  and outward 
bearing,  which,  more  than  anything  else,  captivates  and  subdues  the  great  mass  of 
mankind . . .". Pillans' colleague, the moral philosopher John Wilson, similarly argued 
that "it  is, after all, by mind alone that the high-born can maintain their right unques- 
tioned",  and that only by advance in knowledge "can  the peasant lift himself up to the 
level of the peer".  Changes in knowledge could, therefore, be adduced as explanations of 
social change, and the existing distribution of knowledge could likewise be given as an 
account of the social hierarchy. Of the the higher classes, Wilson assured his readers that 
"instructed they must be, for their knowledge gives them their rank [and] makes them feel 
it . .  .".20 
'Country Gentleman', strenuously objecting to the extension of adult education through 
Mechanics' Institutes, also insisted on the necessary connection between the hierarchy of 
knowledge and the social hierarchy. To  increase the knowledge of the lower orders would 
be inevitably to make them desire to rise in society to the level appropriate to their new 
intellectual state. And to do so would also be to provide them with the means of rising, for 
knowledge was a dangerous resource, possession of which might tempt them to transform 
a perfectly satisfactory and stable social order into the pathological state of democracy.  21 
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character  of  a  resource  was  central  to  the  conservative  position  of  Sir  Archibald 
Alison of Edinburgh, who took it as grounds for opposing Whig pressure for the wider 
diffusion of secular education. To provide knowledge without religion, said Alison, gave 
power and freedom of choice to human beings whose basic nature was evil and depraved. 
In the past this tendency had corrupted the great and the affluent; today it would corrupt 
the masses : 
". . . Human nature in all ranks is the same; . . . knowledge is power to all, but 
wisdom only to those who use it rightly; . . . so far from mere secular education 
being an antidote to evil, or a preservative against the progress of social corrup- 
tion, it has the greatest possible tendency to increase both, if not restrained by 
the force of moral precept, and sanctified by the simultaneous spread of religious 
instruction." 22 
[Thus this  legal gentleman  identified  the moral  commolty in which  he  dealt as  an 
effective source of  control, and the commodity  in which  Henry Brougham  dealt as  a 
source of demonic power to the masses.] 
Alison and 'Country Gentleman'  offered articulate and interesting variants of  conser- 
vative argument against popular education, especially as it was conceived by the supporrers 
of the  Mechanics'  Institutes  and the  Society for the Diffusion of Useful  Knowledge. 
Alison saw real problems of social control in society which needed to be dealt with by the 
extension of religious instruction and practices. Wherever religion was not, there know- 
ledge increased evil; as religion was weakest among the masses, there knowledge should 
be disseminated least of all. Everywhere knowledge was a resource people would bend to 
their general aims; and when people were unconstrained by religion, these aims would, of 
necessity, be evil. In contrast, 'Country Gentleman'  painted a picture of an idyllic state 
in which the "uneducated  labourer is . ..  happy in his contented hearth"-"His  knowledge 
measured to his stateand place".  There existed in Britain at that time, according to 'Country 
Gentleman',  a stable twin hierarchy of knowledge and status. The social hierarchy, from 
King to the  'Common People',  was  associated with  a hierarchy  of knowledge. It was 
traditional to confine "the superior sort of education to birth and wealth", but it was also 
essential to the stability of the social edifice that knowledge be graded  before distribu- 
ti0n.2~ 
This, however, was a view not confined to 'Country Gentleman',  but implicit also in the 
writings of his opponents,  the advocates of popular  instruction. They emphasized the 
dependence of the social upon the intellectual hierarchy by the very form of their denial 
of the charge that popular education tended to lessen due deference from the lower orders 
and "respectful  deportment toward their superiors": 
"By  having a measure of knowledge, and of the power and practice of thinking, 
the people would be enabled to form some notion of what it must be, and what it 
is worth, to have a great deal more of these endowments. They would observe 
and understand the indications of this ampler possession in the minds of those 
above them, and so would be aware of the great disparity between themselves 
and  these  superiors.  And  since  they  would  value  thelnselves on  their  com-
paratively small share of these mental advantages . . ., they would be compelled 
to estimate by the same scale the persons dignified by so far surpassing a share 
of this admired wealth."24 
An ignorant population would not even be able to recognize the scale if it were not ensured 
that, through education, they became its bottom element. 
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keep 'due proportion',  they would be stimulated themselves to advance in knowledge- 
thus increasing the total stock of knowledge, the moral tone of society and the store of 
potentially useful information: 
".  . . This pressure from below, which is created by attention paid to popular 
education, is sure to make the upper and middle classes take care of themselves 
and improve their own."25 
'Country Gentleman' could not agree: 
". . .  If the working classes are to be taught the sciences, what are the middle 
and higher  classes  to  learn,  to preserve  the  due proportion? The answer is 
obvious  enough.  There  is  nothing  they  can  be  taught  by  which  they  can 
maintain their superiority. . .  .''26 
Thus, practically all the writers involved in these controversies over the distribution of 
education invoked a necessary correlation of knowledge and authority within the heirarchy 
of any stable society. And they all held the manipulation of knowledge to be a means of 
manipulating the social order. Where they differed was in their assessments of the dangers 
involved in diffusing knowledge to  the  lower  orders.  Knowledge  could  be  treated  as 
potentially powerful, as a source of competence-either a direct resource in the acquisition 
of standing and political significance, or an indirect resource which brought power through 
wealth, as many nineteenth-century Baconians believed. Or its power might be thought 
to lie in its use as a symbol in the ritualistic display and celebration of  hierarchy.  And 
there were many more variants on the theme of knowledge as a dangerous potential source 
of power, and its distribution as a reinforcement of the social order. 
How then was it that there was any pressure at all for the diffusion of knowledge? If all 
recognized that the social order was sustained by a hierarchical distribution of knowledge, 
why was it desired to impart more than the barest minimum of knowledge to the lower 
orders? Even if the risk of disturbing 'due proportion' was slight, why was it taken at all? 
Part of the answer would appear to be that popular education could be taken as an experi- 
mental attempt at social control and stabilization by  communities which perceived,  or 
or thought they perceived, real breakdowns and weaknesses in the social order. 'Country 
Gentleman's'  account of the social order as healthy and stable would appeal to those who 
indeed experienced it that way. In all likelihood, such groups would see a disturbance of 
the distribution of knowledge as a pointless risk. They would respond to a dramatization 
of this risk which spoke of the power of knowledge to stimulate desire and to provide the 
means to press upwards from the base of society. The advocates of popular education, 
on the other hand, perhaps because they were active in urban areas with rapidly-growing 
and far  from  docile  working-class populations,  represented  society  as  already  in  an 
unhealthy  and potentially  dangerous  state.  The labouring  classes  evidently  were  not 
rendered  subservient and dependent  because  of  their  ignorance.  Rather  they  seemed 
thereby rendered vulnerable to the polemics of agitators and radicals, and susceptible to 
the  temptations  of  the  ale-house,  gambling  table  and  brothel.  Could  knowledge  be 
exploited as a resource in social control, given that the lower orders left to themselves 
would otherwise turn to knowledge and develop ways of thinking which boded ill for the 
existing order? 
'Country  Gentleman'  and Alison had rationalized concern with the disturbance of the 
distribution of knowledge by representing knowledge as a resource for the lower orders; it 
gave them potential; it might convert  docile, impotent banausic mentalities into more 
dangerous and threatening gnostic ones. (Alison, it should be noted, regarded the masses 
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evidently concerned with the power their misunderstanding of that knowledge might give 
them,  and  with  the  dangers  of  their  intellects  thus  transformed,  that  the  point  can 
reasonably be made.) The advocates of popular education, on the other hand, wished to 
experiment with knowledge as  a source of social control. Accordingly, they represented 
knowledge as  a resource capable of fixing the mentalities of a working-class population 
which  was  showing disturbing  signs of  independen~e.~'  We  find them  characterizing 
knowledge as something which could couple the masses to the control of those above, a 
"medium of complacent communication" between the head and the hand.28  And we find 
kinds of knowledge being proposed tofix the banausic mentality and limit the scope of its 
thought, to ballast it and make it less easily swayed by agitators, tofill it up so as to leave no 
room for radical ideas or other errors of wicked and depraved men, and to dizert it so that 
it had less time in which it might be drawn to sensuous indulgences and political follies.29 
To all these laudable aims the opponents of popular education replied with rich irony 
and scorn : 
"The  great error  of  the  philosophical party  . . . consists in this,  that they 
supposed that what they took pleasure in themselves every one else would take 
pleasure in; and that Bacon, Newton,  and Locke would prove as  effectual a 
counterpoise to sensual allurements or guilty excitation in the whole labouring 
population,  as  it did  in Herschel,  or  Brewster,  or  Babbage, or  Whewell, or 
Professor Forbes, or Ivory, or such gifted  spirit^."^" 
And with regard to the ability of popular scientific education to divert the lower orders 
from political activity, the Tony Alison quoted the marvellous lesponse of some of their 
leaders : 
"We are anxiously looking for a new system of social organization, in harmony 
with the lights of the age, and Lord Brougham thinks to stop our mouths with 
kangaroo^."^^ 
TWO TRADITIONS OF CHILD PEDAGOGY 
We have already seen how the two mentalities and the way they related to knowledge were 
exploited as resources in nineteenth-century  controversies which were largely concerned 
with adult education. Now we shall turn to writings which are mainly concerned with the 
education  of children and see  there  also the use  of identical  thought  materials.  Two 
traditions can clearly be discerned in the pedagogical writings of the period. One tradition 
was primarily related to the education of the children of the lower orders, the other with 
the instruction of the young of the higher ranks and newly wealthy middle classes. They 
both exploited the resources previously set out, because they took the social hierarchy as 
a metaphor for the educational hierarchy, at the foot of which was the child. Thus, the 
child was initially characterized as possessing a banausic mentality. 
The first tradition was concerned with forms of knowledge and pedagogic technique 
most suited to banausic mentalities. It outlined the knowledge which made them most 
useful in society-that  which the hand should possess to make it most responsive and 
useful to the head. It  discussed the knowledge which would most effectively fix and stab- 
ilize  their  mentality  and  hence  control  their  actions. And  it considered  the  teaching 
methods  most appropriate for communicating with such mentalities. We shall call this 
the banausic tradition because it was concerned with the education of banausoi, and not 
because it alone took the model of the banausic mentality as a resource in its thinking. 
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The second tradition, concerned with the education of the superior portion of society, 
addressed itself to the problem of assisting the emergence and growth of gnostic mentali- 
ties. For this reason we shall call it the gnostic tradition of pedagogy. Insofar as the gnostic 
tradition was interested in the banausic mentality, it was interested in its transformation. 
The gnostic tradition considered the forms of knowledge and the pedagogic techniques 
which  could  best  facilitate  this  transformation,  and  subsequently  best  exercise  and 
extend the range of competences of the gnostic mentality. Unlike the banausic tradition, 
the gnostic tradition was little concerned with what knowledge its subjects required for the 
proper performance  of their social and economic roles. The main thing was  that  they 
should acquire the colnpentences appropriate to the gnostic mentality,  whereupon  they 
would be  able readily to learn and understand  whatever knowledge they subsequently 
required.  Knowledge  in education was  justified  in this  tradition  as  a vehicle for  the 
transmission of general mental skills and competences. Science, mathematics, languages, 
or the perversities of grammar would be held to 'train  the mind7. (Had we been dealing 
with the realities of educational practice rather than its rhetoric we  should have had to 
consider and explain the remarkable differences between the two. For a great deal of the 
education of the elite centred on the mechanistic transfer of information, rote learning, 
and all the techniques held to be appropriate for the banausoi.) 
Let us first consider pedagogical discussions of how knowledge and competence was 
supposed to be transmitted to the mind of the  Many writers noted the importance 
of operating  through  the medium of children's  sensory capabilities wherever possible, 
and eschewing appeals to abstract intellectual faculties, but the sensory avenue was most 
strongly stressed in the banausic tradition. The banausic tradition gave the sensory path- 
way a privileged position; it was held to be the easiest, or even the only way of making an 
inroad to the mind.  The Quarterly Journal  of  Education,  produced in the 1830s by the 
Pestalozzian circles in the  Society for the Diffusion of Useful  Knowledge,  favourably 
assessed the school at Cheam conducted by the Rev. Charles Mayo and his sister Eliza- 
beth.  "The mind of the child",  the editors agreed, 
"is  very much under  the influence of the organs of sense, and is continually 
drawn away from one object to another, as each successively presents itself".33 
The controlled presentation of actual objects thus appeared as the core of the educational 
experience. In the Mayos'  influential Lessons on  Objects, which reached ten editions by 
1845, the 'object lesson' was the centre-piece of pedagogy. The chief aim was "to cultivate 
the faculty of observation,  this being the first faculty developed in the infant mind".34 
A similar policy was steadily pursued by the Edinburgh Sessional School for the urban 
poor, conducted by John Wood. Here it was made very clear that the study of common 
objects was  an alternative educational base to the use  of  words,  symbols  and  abstract 
concepts : 
". . . Never should there be too long and too scrutinizing an investigation into 
the mysteries of great discoveries and high sciences . . .; but rather agreeable 
descriptions and examinations of objects within  the reach of their  senses and 
understanding. . . ."35 
The educational work of the Rev. Richard Dawes at King's Somborne among the children 
of the lower orders, like that of Wood and the Mayos, stressed the unsuitability of words 
and abstractions as educational media, and emphasized the propriety of studying 'common 
objects'.  Dawes' explicit educational aim was,  like that of almost all his fellow popular 
educationalists, an improved moral and religious condition among the lower orders, but, 
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This was accomplished through stimulation of the sensory pathway; the aim of the teacher 
should be "to make the children observant and reflective; to make them think and reason 
about the objects around them. ..".36  Objects were, therefore, uniquely suited, and words 
and  abstractions  were  peculiarly unsuited,  to provide  the foundation upon  which the 
development of thinking among the lower orders could take place.37  Thus, by the middle 
third of the nineteenth century, an important tradition in educational thinking developed, 
which stressed the role of 'science' in the teaching of the young of the common people, but 
which was based in fact upon the presentation of a variety of natural and technical objects, 
accompanied by glosses upon their constitution, function, taxonomic position and moral 
significance. The role of science in this tradition was therefore clearly predicated upon a 
model of how the lower orders thought and how to gain access to their minds, in order then 
to achieve a variety of intellectual and moral  objective^.^^ 
However, where the banausic tradition stressed the role of sensation as  the basis  of 
knowledge, the  gnostic  tradition  dealt  with  the  senses quite  differently.  The sensory 
faculties were either of little significance; or their importance declined with one's progress 
through the curriculum; or they were an educational nuisance, sources of error and dis- 
tortion which were not to be stimulated or developed. To transcend the banausic men- 
tality the intellectual faculties had to be exercised and the sensual faculties left to atrophy. 
Maria and R. L. Edgeworth's  Essays on  Practical Education,  "principally  intended . . . 
for the higher  classes of society",  advocated extreme circumspection  on the pedagogic 
role of objects and demonstrations. In reference to the teaching of physics, they defended 
the propriety and importance of using symbolic, verbal and abstract formulations : 
"It requires no elaborate argument to prove that a boy, whose mind was stored 
with accurate images of external objects, of experimental knowledge, and who 
had acquired habitual dexterity, but who was unacquainted with the usual signs 
by which ideas are expressed, would be  incapable  of  accurate  reasoning, or 
would, at best, reason only upon particulars.  Without general terms he could 
not abstract; he could not . . .  reason upon general topics, or draw conclusions 
from general principles. 39 
Such a person would be in the position of someone who had to go through tedious calcula- 
tions,  rather  than using  algebra to solve a problem.  The pedagogic moral  was  clear: 
sensually based forms of communication and learning had to be abandoned as soon as 
was practicably possible. 
Knowledge might be presented in the curriculum of the gnostic tradition as progressing 
from  the particular  and concrete, but the ultimate end of essential knowledge (in the 
literal sense) had to be kept clearly in sight.40  "The habit of abstraction",  the Edgeworths 
argued, "is  highly advantageous to the mind".  One's progress "in real knowledge depends 
upon rejecting all that is superflu~us".~~  The individual's  development,  as  well as  the 
development  of  an entire  body  of  knowledge,  was  represented  as  itself  a process  of 
abstraction, of moving from the particular to the general, from the concrete instance to 
the relational concept, of moving, thereby, upwards along the mental hierarchy. Thus, the 
gnostic pedagogical tradition,  as contrasted with the banausic tradition,  imputed to its 
subjects the mental capacity to cope with abstract concepts and to base their thought upon 
the process of essentializing knowledge away from the sensory, the concrete and the parti- 
cular. The personal knowledge thus mastered  and internalized  is  not merely different 
from that marshalled in the banausic tradition; it is regarded as indubitably better. 
The second distinction between the banausic and gnostic traditions concerns the nature 
of the knowledge appropriate in educating the child. In the banausic tradition knowledge 
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passively responding banausic mentality. In the gnostic tradition knowledge provided the 
mind with a resource, and the more abstract and general it was, the greater was its potency 
as a resource. The more the gnostic mentality learned, the more it was capable of using 
knowledge as a resource, and, thus, the more it was  a genuine gnostic mentality.  This 
contrast is brought out by examining how the two traditions treated the educational role 
of the fact. 
The Edgeworths,  in prescribing  proper  pedagogical practice for the children of the 
upper orders, "strongly encourage[d] . . .  teachers", 
"to use as few precepts as possible in the rudiments of science, and to encourage 
their pupils to use their own understandings as they advance".42 
"The sciolist",  they asserted, "has  only learned to talk-we  wish to teach our pupils to 
think, upon the various objects of human spe~ulation".~~  Facts, inculcated by rote, were 
unsuitable for the ends of the gnostic tradition: ". . . Let [the pupils] never be required to 
repeat in the words of the book . . .; let them speak in words of their own, and arrange 
their ideas to their own plan . .  ."44 
The same set of distinctions  and practical injunctions suggested themselves to Pro- 
fessor James Pillans, who made the comparative social bases of the two traditions very 
plain. He criticized the technical ambition of much popular  education,  suggesting that 
failure in many cases was  to be attributed to the vanity of efforts to initiate even the 
adults of the lower orders "into  the mysteries of chemistry and astronomy".  "Many  of 
the attempts",  Pillans said, "to enlighten the adults of the labouring classes . . . are of a 
cast too abstruse and scientific". 
"On  the other hand,  a mistake of a different kind has been of  late still more 
prevalent-that  of overlaying the mind of the young aspirant to a liberal pro- 
fession with the facts  ascertained  and the results  arrived  at  by  learned  and 
scientific research, while he is left unacquainted with the steps and processes of 
the proof. . . .He should not be tempted to take all upon trust, on the ipse dixit 
of a lecturer, but should be put through such a course of mental gymnastics, as 
might enable him to climb the tree and gather the ripe fruit for himself. . ."45 
His colleague, Professor Wilson, substantially agreed with Pillans' diagnoses. Knowledge 
might very well be crafted for purposes  of symbolic display and personal development 
among the 'higher classes', but "with the poor, or inferior man, you wish to see something 
more solid in his knowledge . . .". While one might envision teaching all social classes the 
same subject, it was essential to make pedagogic distinctions in the structure of the body 
of knowledge : 
"Also,  it is for many reasons very important, that discriminations be made in 
each  [subject] between  what it most certainly  established,  and what is  con- 
jectural and doubtful, presenting to [the lower orders] as much as possible the 
first and not the second."46 
Wilson explicitly justified distinctions in the two pedagogies on the basis of the subject's 
social and economic role. Of the lower orders, he said that 
"Knowledge is not their business. . . .  Their business is to render a prescribed 
and taught,  and, for the most part,  a very simple, and a uniformly  recurring 
labour. Their calling, then,  is  in a great measure independent  of knowledge, 
except what is communicated to them in it. . . .  It is otherwise with the higher 
orders. . . . The sphere of their action is high and wide, and often demands, is 
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So the role of the fact in the two pedagogic traditions was  to differ.  Usage might be 
rationalized by referring to notions of what the subjects' minds 'would take',  or it might 
be justified  by pointing to the use knowledge or competences would be to the recipients 
in their station and calling. 
As  far as the banausic tradition is concerned the lower orders needed facts, and facts 
should be inserted into their heads in the amount their educators felt appropriate. The 
recipients would passively accept the transmitted facts and their behaviour would subse- 
quently be restrained by their awareness of the facts. The fixed banausic mentality lacked 
the capacity actively to exploit facts as instruments. No doubts are evident in the banausic 
tradition as to whether the factual knowledge would 'take'.  In thls tradition, knowledge is 
something that one 'puts in', because the mind of its subject is something into which one 
'puts'  things. 
But no doubts were expressed among the writers in  the  gnostic  tradition  that  the 
relationship of mind to knowledge was an active one. Knowledge was an instrument, not 
a made thing. The Edgeworths'  formulation is illuminating: 
"'Vl'e  are not solicitous about the quantity of knowledge that is obtained at any 
given age, but we are extremely anxious that the desire to learn should con- 
tinually increase, and that whatever is taught should be taught with that per- 
spicacity, which impresses the general understanding. . . ."48 
The mind grapples with knowledge; it is active and manipulative. As  Wilson said, 'the 
higher classes' look  "upon  knowledge as a great war which they are all carrying on to- 
gether".  The end of their education is "to  animate"  and "cherish"  this feeling.49 They 
should feel,  appropriately,  that  they  march  "in  the van  of  the  conquests  of  human 
intellect".  The mind is agonistic; knowledge is a suitable antagonist on which one exer- 
cises one's muscles. To Professor Pillans, education for the higher classes 
". . . Must be a course of intellectual discipline, directed, not to stock the mind 
with ready prepared information, but to bring out in orderly and healthful suc- 
cession the several mental faculties, to give each its appropriate nourishment and 
invigorating exercise, and to teach the possessor the free and dextrous use of 
them all. . . ."jO 
Pillans too linked pedagogical prescription to social role: 
"In this case, the point to be aimed at it not a great store of knowledge of which 
the mind is little better than a passive recipient. The legitimate object of higher 
education  is,  to provide  the  means  of  evolving and  perfecting  the various 
powers and capacities of man's  nature,  so as  to enable him,  in the words of 
Milton,  'to  perform justly,  skilfully, and magnanimously, all the offices, both 
public and private, of peace and war'."jl 
In the gnostic tradition, knowledge potentiates; it does not determine. 
The determining character of knowledge and the assumption of a receptacle mind in 
the banausic tradition is indicated  by the replacement theory  to which so many advocates 
of popular  adult  education  subscribed.  By  filling the mind  with useful  and innocent 
knowledge,  it was  argued by popular  educationalists that there would be less room for 
'brutalizing pursuits', that the recipients would be fenced "against  the seduction of low 
and sensual indulgences".  "But  in the liberal education",  Pillans said, 
"the question is not, how shall [we] fill up most agreeably an idle hour. It is, by 
what means we shall best secure the general and, up to a certain point, equable 
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The practical  pedagogical  instruments  to  achieve  this  balanced  cultivation  of  the 
gnostics' intellectual faculties might vary from context to context, although many educa- 
tionalists were convinced that certain 'subjects'  were inherently superior for the purpose. 
Traditionally, the study of dead languages and ancient forms of mathematics have been 
argued to be 'good exercise for the mind'.  In the Scottish situation, it was often geometry 
which possessed this unique  arcanum; algebra and analytic mathematics  were merely 
mechanical.j3 Professor Wilson wished the elite to continue to study Greek, Latin and 
Hebrew, "were  it only for the subtle cultivation of intellectual power that is obtained in 
the mere acquisition of them".j4  The particular connections which have existed between 
each pedagogical tradition and specific bodies of knowledge is a subject we  cannot take 
up here. One may suggest that any and all subjects, taught in any and all actual manners, 
can be argued to be 'good exercise for the mind'.  What one may be seeing is the rational- 
ization of traditional pedagogical practice, rather than the disinterested identification of 
especially appropriate bodies of knowledge.j5 The central notion in the rhetorical formu- 
lations we have just displayed is not the 'subject',  but the portrayal of an active, intellec- 
tual and voluntary mind juxtaposed to knowledge in the gnostic tradition, and a passive, 
sensual and determined mind in the banausic tradition. 
THE BASIS  OF THE THOUGHT MATERIAL 
Both in the debates about the wider establishment of adult education, and in writings on 
the teaching of children, we have now observed the utilization of a basic set of shared 
cultural resources or what we may call 'thought  materials'.  In all the diverse and con- 
flicting writings  two  kinds  of  mentality  were invoked,  the banausic  and  the gnostic, 
with opposed styles of thought and contrasting orientations to external sources of know- 
ledge and experience. Through different accounts of the basis of these mentalities, and 
the extent to which they were transmutable by educational processes and by the trans- 
mission of various kinds of knowledge, arguments for and against a wide range of possible 
educational programmes were generated, and the alleged consequences of diverse courses 
of action were displayed. These arguments centred on the consequences of various pro- 
grammes for the distribution of power  and the stability  of  the social hierarchy,  since 
education was,  as always, primarily taken as a means of realizing political objectives. 
Mainly  because of the historical  context  which  was  chosen as  a source of concrete 
materials, practically all our examples involved celebration of the gnostic mentality and 
denigration of the banausic. In a debate which focussed upon the desirability of educating 
the masses,  alleged  contrasts  between  the higher  and lower  orders of society were of 
central significance. Writers portrayed themselves and their peers as  gnostics, and the 
masses as banausoi, in order to create and make visible a hierarchy of worth with which to 
justify  a hierarchy of.standing, wealth  and privilege. The use of the two mentalities as 
resources in  argument and justification is not, however, restricted in any way; they can 
be deployed in whatever fashion people find expedient, and they have been deployed in 
the past in ways which contrast strikingly with those usages illustrated above. At times, for 
example, the banausic mentality has been celebrated by polemicists, and held to be the 
superior of the two mentalities. 
Emergent groups, struggling against entrenched elites, have been particularly given to 
rhetoric of this kind.  Frequently, they have celebrated the qualities of the 'hand',  and 
assailed the sterility, vacuousness and abstraction of the thought of the 'head'  in their 
society. They have valued the senses as direct sources of authentic knowledge, and deve- 
loped empiricist, inductivist epistemologies with which to condemn the abstract,  specu- 
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asserted the value of practical manipulation, observation and experimental procedures as 
tests of the validity of knowledge, in order to deride the cloistered, contemplative life of 
the spirit so often held as the ideal among orthodox intellectual elites. Among the many 
such iconoclastic groups who have so celebrated the 'hand' we can point to the Paracelsians 
of the late Renaissance, the Baconian polemicists of seventeenth-century England,  and 
the phrenologist-reformers  of early nineteenth-century Britain and the United StateseZ6 
Similarly, the two mentalities have been used as resources by those who have set the 
main thrust of their rhetoric against attempts to identify two distinct kinds of individuals 
in society. Such writers have tended to take the mentalities as aspects or potentialities of 
the psyche. All people are both gnostic and banausic naturally or potentially;  the dif- 
ferences or apparent differences between individuals are either illusory or the products of 
social contingencies. The work of the phrenologist George Combe is a particularly good 
instance, from our period, of rhetoric of this kind; but, as we should expect, it tends to 
appear in conjunction with many kinds of argument for ameliorative reform.5i 
The two models were, then, capable of being used in an endless variety of ways, and 
actually were used in very many. It is not our central concern here to catalogue the ob- 
served range of uses, or to suggest when and in what circumstances one or other mode of 
use is likely to occur. What we want to make significant, and to direct curiosity towards, is 
the fact that the two models were  used,  time and again, in argument after  argument, 
polemic after polemic. For the models cannot be taken as analogous, say, to ideal-typical 
descriptions of animal or plant species, confirmed and repeatedly supported by empirical 
evidence. We are encountering here a particularly  interesting kind of stereotype.  The 
characteristics of the mind are evidently entities which members  of all cultures 'know' 
about, and confidently 'know'  about, quite apart from  their  personal  experiences,  or 
theories of scientific method, or sensitivity to the problems of psychological investigation. 
Our  writers  were  typical in that they confidently referred  to mental types, expecting 
to be  believed, and feeling no need  to cite empirical evidence or  personal  study and 
investigation which supported their commentary. 
In all  societies,  as  people  interact,  order  themselves,  ally  and  oppose  each  other, 
exploit each other and support each other,  imputed mental characteristics emerge and 
become institutionalized as rationalizing structures, which can be turned to as reasons and 
legitimations for action, or for explaining why things are as they are. Those who occupy 
positions towards the top of a hierarchy almost universally employ two general strategies 
among those which they use to justify themselves. One is to appeal to naturalistic justi- 
fications of the division of labour laid out below them; the other is to employ the analogy 
of the body to enrich and reinforce their naturalistic  justification^.^^ Thus, in the materials 
cited above, the activities at the various levels of the division of labour were transformed 
into modes of thought, and types of mentality  and mental  competence. Roles,  socially 
required operations,  become mental  characteristics, intrinsic features  of persons.  That 
which men were obliged to do, or privileged to do, became that which men were fitted for. 
And the whole scheme was coloured by the image of head and hand which so appropriately 
expressed the structure of the division of labour and its hierarchical arrangement. Thus, 
we  might say that these  writers  'knew'  men's  minds  because they  'knew'  their  social 
roles; and they 'knew'  them in such detail because they 'knew'  that the head controlled 
the hand and what were the characteristics of the one and the other. These writers knew 
what most men with an interest in sustaining a particular social heirsrchy and division of 
labour know. Gnostic and banausic mentalities have been known to many men in many 
cultures. 
As educationalists and as purveyors of  knowledge,  however, these writers also projected 
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the  two  kinds  of  thinkers.  We  find  'high'  knowledge and  'low'  knowledge:  the  one 
abstract, symbolic and complex, a resource for thought; the other concrete,  direct and 
simple, a constraint and determinant of thought. And we find the typical assumption of 
educationalists that knowledge is powerful, and that the hierarchy of knowledge is  of  at 
least equal significance to the other two hierarchies of authority and mentality.  In the 
perennial  debate  between  idealism  and  materialism,  the teacher,  the  scholar  and the 
intellectual have always been moved by their social interests towards the defense of ideas; 
even self-professed Marxists in modern times have been hard put to it to resist idealism, 
if they occupied academic or intellectual roles. 
Thus, the supposed mentalities and the properties of knowledge invoked by the educa- 
tionalists  in  our  context  cannot  be  understood  as  empirically-informed  hypotheses, 
checked  and  developed  by  experience  and investigation.  This is  not  to  say  that  the 
inputations were nothing more than wish-fulfilment, or that the writers in question paid 
no attention to empirical reality and what they were manifestly capable of observing in 
their social context. On the contrary, the imputations doubtless were related to empi~ical 
observations, and probably  were found to offer plausible accounts  of  them.  They did 
successfully make sense of much social experience and organize it theoretically. The point 
is  that the way  sense was  made has to be understood in terms of the character  of the 
social hierarchy,  and the situated interests and experiences of writers  and polemicists 
within it. And, more importantly, the resources out of which sense was made were con- 
structs of a kind which we find generated in most social orders as bases for legitimation and 
rationalization. 
What general conclusions can be drawn then about the use of the two  constructed 
mentalities in pedagogical theorizing? It is tempting to dismiss them as devices of pole- 
micists and writers lacking real  sympathy and curiosity  with respect to the subjects of 
education. But this would be  unfair  in some cases at least, and,  more importantly, it 
would underestimate the general predicament of pedagogical thought. All thinking, even 
the  most  esoteric,  technical  and  non-evaluative,  must  draw  upon  existing  concepts, 
beliefs, models or images as resources or raw materials. It must develop and test theories 
created  from available systems of  meaning.  And  practically  all  the thought materials 
relevant to the conceptualization of pedagogical questions is already bound up in rational- 
izing  structures  and existing informal  claims  which everybody  routinely  makes  about 
others'  minds,  thoughts,  beliefs and so  on. If we  may  so put  it,  current empirically- 
informed pedagogy is obliged to use the same thought materials as the rhetorical pedagogy 
we have displayed. To  proceed it must first plunge into the morass of rationalizations and 
informal models which currently exists. Hence, it is endemically susceptible to influence 
from and interaction with forms of culture generated to fulfil rationalizing functions. And 
even it it could be cut off from this interaction,  it is unclear to what extent theories of 
pedagogy could be 'filtered'  and 'purified'  by exposure to empirical feedback. Desirable 
though such feedback may be, however does one identify the point at which it entitles 
one to forget the resources employed in the construction of one's theories, and proceed as 
though they were the simple truth? 
To emphasize that such questions are neither trivial nor  esoteric, it is worth noting 
just how much of current educational thinking is structured by the very categories which 
have proved  so significant in the historical  works  cited  above. The concreteiabstract, 
sensuaiisymbolic dichotomies, for example, continue to run strong in psychological work 
on intellectual  development,  child learning and intelligence testing.  Piaget's  work, and 
'Piaget's  theory'  as an institution cited and believed in by educationalists, centres right 
upon them. The tradition of IQ testing and its opposition have fought for a long period 
over issues defined in the same way; a contemporary instance is the controversy generated 248  Oxford Review  of Education 
by Arthur Jensen's recent comments on the contrast of associative and conceptual learning 
and their respective merits for the disadvantaged.jg Similarly, in educational sociology 
Basil  Bernstein's  work,  which represents  the  only  developed theoretical  discussion of 
educational knowledge and pedagogy, is concerned to explore how the social organization 
of  knowledge in  curricula,  its  internal  intellectual  connections  and boundaries,  their 
strength and rigidity,  the linguistic codes in which knowledge is  transmitted,  and its 
factual/analogical qualities can all contribute to the maintenance of social order, both in 
the  immediate  context  of  the  educational  institution  and,  indirectly,  in  the  wider 
society.60 
Similar themes have diffused through the social sciences generally. They are present, 
for example, in the long tradition of sociological writings on reification. The central themes 
of this tradition are found in a particularly refined and extreme formulation in the work of 
some currently active 'ethnomethodologists'.  They warn us against the way that so-called 
'objective knowledge' is  liable to stultify and restrict the mind, and seek  to neutralize 
this insidious influence by reminding us that knowledge is something which we ourselves 
actively create, one of our practical accomplishments. To allow oneself to be gripped and 
compelled by a sense of the external objective validity of positive science (and, particularly, 
orthodox sociology) is to place oneself among the banausoi, a fate to be avoided only by 
intense mental vigilance.61 
Predominantly,  however, it is not positive scientists who have been characterized as 
banausoi in the various social science disciplines, but the three great significant groups of 
'others'-aliens,  ancestors and deviants.'j2 The former provide the most obvious example, 
as they have been characterized in the literature of social anthropology. Earlier anthropo- 
logists  characterized  primitive  thought  as  peculiarly  concrete  and  sensual.  Material 
objects and particular ritual acts played the role taken by abstract metaphysical principles 
in our own thought. All kinds of crude causal determinants explained the nature of their 
thought. Primitives were banausoi, and their thought, made out as  essentially different 
in kind from our own, could be regarded as defective accordingly. More recently, it has 
been thought appropriate to value the thought of preliterate societies, and it has been 
treated accordingly as very much more like our own. The thought of the 'primitive'  (who 
now increasingly exists between inverted commas) has been found to be suffused with 
gnostic features.  In the work  of LCvi-Strauss,  for  example, it emerges as  remarkably 
logical and coherent, animated by intellectual curiosity and not 'merely'  by use, inferior to 
our own intellectual operations only because it lacks the freedom of fully abstract con- 
ceptual thought and retains  some of the restricting concreteness of the thought of the 
banausoi.63 
If we are to think at all, we have to employ the thought materials with which our culture 
provides us,  however  'tainted'  we may find them to be. There is no escaping this pre- 
dicament; indeed, this present paper  is  no more  successful in escaping it than those 
writers with whom we have dealt. Hence, there is little point in criticizing the educational- 
ist or the social theorist  simply because he operates with particular  materials. There is 
some point, however, in suggesting that we retain an awareness of the resources we employ 
in  thinking,  and  the  general  character  of  our  thinking  and  theorizing  itself  as 
bri~olage.~~ 
This suggestion should apply with particular force in the case of pedagogic theorizing 
for two reasons. First, the cultural resources we have to employ in this area inevitably 
link our thought with established structures of rationalization and make it vulnerable to 
our own unstated and, perhaps, unrealized informal conceptions of social order. Secondly, 
as academics we are very likely to possess a gnostic self-conception and to be all too ready 
to equate the banausic with the inferior. As a simple test of this propensity the reader may Head  and  Hand  249 
wish to reflect whether he suspects this paper to be either an 'attack' upon or a devaluation 
of the status of 'rational thought'.  For such thought is explicitly treated here as bricolage. 
And the bricoleur, for all his ingenuity and creativity, remains of the banausoi. 
Appendix: Note on Sources and Methods 
One of the inspirations which prompted this paper was the work over the past four years 
of one of us (S. S.) on the diffusion of scientific culture and scientific education in Britain 
during the Industrial Revolution. It became apparent during the course of that work that 
there  was  great  uniformity in the rhetorical  arsenal people  drew  upon to justify  the 
dissemination of scientific knowledge or princip1es.a  The study of nature was justified by 
constant reference to the 'natural order of things'.  Our interest eventually turned to the 
rhetoric of justification itself-how  it functioned and made sense to people, and the scheme 
of things to which the rhetoric corresponded. We became more concerned with how sense 
was made than with the more usual historical problem of what sense was made, and what 
in particular people were advocating through their rhetoric. This paper therefore lacks an 
important  diachronic  dimension:  while  identifying  and examining  certain  conceptual 
structures, it does not set out to explain what particular measures were justified by their 
use, nor does it attempt to deal with changes in their deployment over time. It is hoped 
that the last section of the paper  will go some way towards justifying the value of our 
'static'  approach. 
Because we  are  dealing  here  with  rhetorical  formulations  which  we  believe to  be 
significantly homogeneous,  certain  difficulties may  arise for  the way  in which  we  use 
sources and present quotations. Given that quotations are commonly displayed to provide 
unique access to the true state of affairs or to allow privileged insight  into a writer's 
thoughts, our usage may seem unsatisfactory to some historians. The quotations displayed 
in this paper seem to us no better or worse than scores of other locutions found in the 
literature;  one is  as  good as  another; the individual's  conceptual structure, in itself, is 
not germane to the reason we cite his thoughts. To  have listed very many sources for each 
locution might have enhanced the historical credibility of our account, but at the risk of 
otioseness. Hopefully, those readers who have worked in this area will experience a sense 
of recognition. 
Our selection of sources has, however, been governed by certain practical considera- 
tions. For one, we were concerned, so far as possible, to display material supplementary 
to the sources in our previous work  on the functions of adult education  in  science.b 
That paper  has the aim of interpreting particular  educational  measures in contextual 
terms, and, ideally, should be read in conjunction with the present piece. Secondly, as we 
were not concerned with displaying the coherent philosophies of individual educational- 
ists, we  have not felt obliged to concentrate upon the utterances  of 'great thinkers',  or 
even to  focus upon those writers  who  exerted 'influence'  on the shape of educational 
innovations.  But we  were quite concerned to locate those rhetorical resources in most 
general circulation among the educated classes. For this purpose we made considerable 
use  of  an informal  survey  of  the general  periodical  literature-the  Edinburgh  Review 
expressing the Whig views of the Brougham camp, Blackwood's  that of the local Tory 
opposition, and the Quarterly Review that of the national Conservative consensus. The 
Quarterly Journal  of  Education was  closely associated with Brougham's  Society for the 
Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in the 1830s. Both the reviews in these periodicals and the 
books and pamphlets noticed therein provide an insight into what notions structured the 
general debate over education in the &st  part of the nineteenth century. 250  Oxford Review of  Education 
It is also a function of limited space that we have not attempted to provide a capsule 
history of the popular education movement in the period. For that we must refer to reader 
to a number of excellent surveys, and trust that the attempted generality of our thesis will 
be set against the lack of empirical background materia1.c 
We must, however, provide very brief biographical notes on some of the less familiar 
writers whose views we cite: 
SIR  ARCHIBALD  (1792-1867) :lawyer and historian, son of an Edinburgh Episcopal  ALISON 
minister.  An  energetic contributor to Blackwood's  Magazine and an optimistic,  but 
staunch, Tory, who pointed out limitations to Malthus' laws and defended the necessity 
of slavery. As  sheriff of Lanarkshire from 1835, he had to deal with a series of serious 
riots and strikes, which he successfully suppressed. 
MARIA & RICHARD LOVELL  (1767-1849; EDGEWORTH  1744-1817):  father and daughter; 
members  of  the  'enlightened'  Lichfield  circle  around  Erasmcs  Darwin  and  much 
influenced by the educational views expressed in Rousseau's  mile. R. L. Edgeworth's 
son was educated as emile and so presented to Rousseau. Maria was a noted novelist, 
especially of works  for  children,  and Richard  was  a member  of  the  Board  for  In- 
quiring into Irish Education (1806-1 I). 
JOHN  FOSTER  (1770-1843):  Yorkshire-born Baptist minister and essayist who contributed 
extensively to the Eclectic Review. He had practical teaching experience with both Irish 
and negroes. He disliked the corporate aspects of religion, and maintained diminishing 
republican sentiments throughout his life. His Evils went through five editions by the 
middle of the century and is perhaps the single most explicit source of psychological 
models which bear upon the debate over popular education. 
'COUNTRY GENTLEMAN': although widely cited by historians of education, no one, to 
our knowledge, has discovered  his identity. 
JAMES PILLANS (1778-1864):  a student of Dugald  Stewart and very  close to the Whig 
Edinburgh Review circle. As  Rector of the Edinburgh High School, he introduced the 
monitorial system. In 1820 he succeeded to the Chair of Humanity (Latin) at Edinburgh 
University, which he held until the year before his death. He gave testimony to the 1834 
Commons Committee on Education and was a strong advocate of compulsory educa- 
tion. 
JOHN  WILSON  (1785-1854):  a lawyer,  poet  and, succeeding Dugald  Stewart, Professor 
of Moral Philosophy  at Edinburgh University.  A  strong Tory and the well-known 
'Christopher North'  of Blackwood's. 
a 	See Arnold  Thackray,  "Natural  Knowledge  in  Cultural  Context:  The Manchester 
Model",  American  Historical  Review,  79  (1974),  672-709;  Shapin,  "The  Pottery 
Philosophical Society, 1819-1835:  An  Examination of the Cultural Uses of Provincial 
Science",  Science Studies, 2 (1972)~  311-336;  Shapin and Thackray,  "Prosopography 
as a Research Tool in History of Science: The British  Scientific Community,  1700- 
goo", History of  Science, 12 (1974)~  1-28. 
b 	Shapin and Barnes, "Science, Nature and Control: Interpreting Mechanics' Institutes", 
Social Studies of  Science, 7 (1977), forthcoming. 
Notably,  David  Layton,  Science for  the  People  (London,  1973); J.  F.  C. Harrison, 
Learning and Living 1790-1960  (London, 1961); Brian Simon, Studies in the History of 
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